interconnected and, when banks failed, losses were largely borne by equity holders.
Contagious failures due to counterparty default were exceedingly rare during the national banking era 2 . Nonetheless, bank panics were extremely costly.
How costly were the banking panics of the national banking era? A natural way to think about this question is to ask how much consumers would have paid to insure against the consumption loss experienced during banking panics. Panic insurance did not exist and consumption data is unavailable but it is possible to use balance sheet and stock return data to draw inferences about the cost of bank panics. I create a measure of bank funding from hand-collected weekly balance sheet statements of the New York Clearing House (NYCH) banks. I use these balance sheets to construct a time series of historical bank funding during the national banking era. I combine this measure of bank funding with another hand collected data set -the cross section of all monthly NYSE stock returns -to draw inferences about investor marginal utility during panics of the national banking era. The results suggest investors cared a great deal about banking panics. Unexpected changes in bank deposits were far more important to the consumption of stock investors than changes in the stock market itself. The cross-section of stock returns imply that national banking era investors would have paid approximately XXX per year to insure against unexpected withdrawals from NYCH banks.
Why were panics so costly? Many real investments have high expected returns but are either irreversible or can only be liquidated at a loss. Savers are aware that they may face unpredictable future liquidity shocks. These two facts combine to create a role for financial intermediaries to pool savings and offer intertemporal risk sharing through a demand deposit or overnight lending contract. In such a setting, a well-functioning intermediary can have a real effect on the level of investment and consumption in the economy 3 .
For example, in the classic model of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) agents know that they may be subject to an unpredictable future liquidity shock. Allen and Gale (1997) . See Allen and Carletti (2008) for a recent survey.
with investment opportunities that, once completed, will yield high real returns but are costly to liquidate early. In the absence of financial intermediation, risk-averse consumers may choose to forgo investment in high return but irreversible technologies if the risk of experiencing a liquidity shock before completion is too high. In such a setting, financial intermediaries can increase aggregate investment and consumption by offering depositors liquidity on demand and investing a portion of their deposits in the high return irreversible technology 4 . Demand deposits improve total welfare but the promise of liquidity on demand creates a mismatch between the maturity of the intermediary's assets and liabilities. This temporal mismatch exposes the intermediary to the risk of a bank run and the economy to the risk of lost output if otherwise high return investments have to be forgone out of fear of a run or liquidated early to satisfy withdrawal requests.
A bank run is characterized by a sudden withdrawal of deposits from the banking system. Runs may be caused by irrational mob psychology 5 , a switch between completely random sunspot equilibria 6 or a rational response to a common signal about future liquidity demands or investment returns 7 . Regardless of the cause, bank runs lower welfare by forcing banks to forgo high return investments or liquidate previous investments at a loss. Traditional remedies like temporary suspension of convertibility, interbank money markets or lenders of last resort (clearing house certificates) were all employed during the national banking era. These remedies can lower the risk of an individual bank failure but create linkages that can result in systematic risks of contagious liquidity withdrawals 8 .
Despite the popular folk history, before the great depression, bank runs seldom resulted in direct losses for creditors or counterparties 9 . Instead, the cost of panics was 4 Diamond and Rajan (2001) , Allen and Gale (2004) 5 Kindleberger (1978) 6 Bryant (1980) , Diamond and Dybvig (1983) 7 Mitchell (1941) , Chari and Jagannathan (1988) , Gorton (1988) , Gale (1998, 2004) 8 Friedman and Schwatz (1963) , Allen and Gale (2000) , Rajan (2005,2006) , Brusco and Castiglionesi (2007 likely due to market freezes and curtailed lending. In the era before too big to fail, creditors were aware that they would not be bailed out and disciplined banks by withdrawing funding whenever they feared a sudden change in actual or perceived solvency 10 . During panics the liquidity of interbank lending vanished and banks responded much like today -by curtailing lending, calling outstanding loans and hoarding excess reserves. The fear of creditor runs disciplined bank risk taking and leverage but to the extent that this fear forced banks to hoard liquidity and forgo investments with high social returns, the panics of the national banking era were costly even in the absence the failure of systemically important banks.
In the sections that follow I 1) describe the regulatory system and runs of the national banking era, 2) describe unique balance sheet data and 1866-1913 stock market data, 3) describe the estimation of a stochastic discount factor to draw inferences about the cost of banking panics, and 4) conclude.
The National Banking Act and "Poverty Corner"
The National Banking Acts (NBA) of 1863 & 1864 reorganized the United States banking system. The NBA unified the national currency, established a national regulator and through regulation of reserve requirements encouraged a national inter-bank money market centered in New York City. The NBA established limits on leverage through reserve requirements, capital requirements including double liability for shareholders, limits on note circulation and the requirement that national bank notes be backed by US government bonds deposited with the comptroller of the currency at a 10% haircut.
Finally, the NBA created explicit lenders of last resort by allowing clearing house certificates issued by reserve and central reserve city clearing houses to be counted as lawful money toward reserve requirements 11 .
The National Banking Act encouraged an interbank lending market by divided the nation's national banks into three groups and providing regulatory incentives to pool excess reserves in central cities. This system required the New York Clearing House (NYCH) banks to expand or contract their balance sheets with the nationwide demand for currency. The tendency of loaned reserves to "vanish when most needed" exposed the NYCH banks to liquidity shocks anywhere in the nation and was often cited as the leading cause of pre-FDIC banking panics. The above quotation requires some translation. In normal times repo loans at poverty corner were quoted in annual percentage rates by type of collateral. Thus if you were to read the money section of the New York Times in a period of relative calm the column would report the annual rates to borrow against US government bond collateral and mixed collateral. Mixed collateral was a portfolio of non-US government bonds where the haircut on each security was adjusted in relation to its risk until the basket was considered homogenous. Therefore, if a broker came with a basket of stocks of varying quality the "gilt-edged" stocks (Vanderbilt lines etc) would be haircut 20% and lent against at the mixed collateral rate. Stocks of lower quality would be assigned a larger haircut for the same interest rate or charged a higher interest rate for the same haircut.
During the panic described in the quote above, the haircut on all but the best collateral went to 100%. That is, no loan could be obtained except with "U.S. Therefore, a measure of excess reserves in New York City is likely to reflect the excess reserves in the entire national banking system and serve as an excellent proxy for nationwide bank funding stress.
1866-1913 Bank Balance Sheet and Stock Return Data
I wish to construct a relatively high frequency historical measure of the health of the banking system that can be used to draw inference about the cost of national banking era panics. This measure should capture both the overall health of the banking system and be observable at the same frequency as stock returns. An excellent candidate is the deposit information contained in the weekly balance sheets of New York City banks.
Contemporaries understood that asymmetric information about the health of individual banks could transform a run on a single bank into a system-wide panic. The NYCH attempted to minimize information asymmetries by requiring its member banks to publish weekly balance sheet statements. These statements appeared in the Saturday morning Insurance Contracts:
Consider a simple asset that pays a discrete amount $X p if a banking panic occurs next period and $X np if no panic occurs. The asset is an insurance contract so $X p > $X np .
If this security trades in a market where investors face the same price to buy or sell the price of the security must satisfy
Where p  is the expected probability of a banking panic and is the investors' stochastic discount factor -the marginal utility of wealth in each state. (2) is derived from the first order condition of investors who can purchase or sell the security until the expected marginal gain from buying E[mX] equals the marginal cost P .
Next consider a nominally risk-free asset that pays $1 in both the panic and no panic states. This asset will trade at P = E [m] . The gross risk-free rate is therefore equal
If we use this definition of the risk-free rate and divide both sides of (2) by P we can express the expected excess return of the insurance contract as a function of the covariance between the insurance return and the stochastic discount factor. This link between observable asset returns and cov(m t ,dep t ) is the key to measuring the effect of banking panics on marginal utility. Given a cross-section of assets with different expected returns a true unobservable stochastic discount factor should explain any cross-sectional differences in these asset returns. Equation (4) constrains the stochastic discount factor to be a linear function of NYCH deposit growth. If a regression of a true unobservable discount factor on deposit growth had high explanatory power then the specification in (4) should do a good job of explaining cross-sectional differences in observable asset prices. On the other hand, if the true discount factor isn't correlated with NYCH deposit growth the candidate discount factor in (4) will have a hard time explaining cross-sectional differences in gilded-age stock returns.
A test of the null hypothesis that banking panics were costly amounts to a test that the candidate discount factor in (4) can explain cross-sectional differences in the return of gilded-age stocks. Many authors have used macroeconomic factors and linear specifications like (4) to test the null hypothesis that a given macroeconomic measure of "good times" explains stock returns. Rather than ask if a given measure of "good times"
can explain asset returns I let asset returns tell me when times were good and test whether changes in our measure of banking panics were correlated with the unobservable utility of national banking era investors.
Estimation:
Suppose we observe N test assets. Let , denote the time t gross returns on the n-th asset and dep t denote the time t growth rate of NYCH deposits. The law of one price implies the moment condition All of our information about unobservable marginal utility must be inferred from the behavior of asset prices. We can sharpen our estimates by forming managed portfolios that follow time-varying investment strategies that are likely correlated with unobservable marginal utility. Likely correlated is a non-trivial statement when the correlation we desire is with respect to an unobservable variable. Any time varying investment rule must be based on information known at the time of portfolio formation and result in differences in expected return. Even in an informationally efficient market public information available at time t can predict cross-sectional differences in returns at time t+1 if the differences in return reflect compensation for risk.
The history of banking panics and national banking era interest rates suggest some potential managed portfolio strategies. The National Monetary Commision (1911), Friedman and Schwartz (1963) and Miron (1986) all note the seasonality of interest rates and banking panics during the gilded-age. Contemporaries were also aware of both the seasonality of interest rates and the increased likelihood of banking panics during the fall.
If consumption risk varied seasonally, portfolios based on seasonal investment strategies should contain information about seasonal variation (if any) in m.
I form 5 managed portfolios that reflect seasonal investment strategies. The first four are long-short strategies based on the calendar quarter. The long Q N portfolio shorts the risk free asset and invests the proceeds in the value-weighted stock market portfolio in the n-th quarter and shorts the market and invests the proceeds in the risk-free asset in the other 3 quarters. The fifth calendar portfolio which I call "Long Harvest" shorts the risk-free asset and invests in the stock market portfolio during the harvest months of August-November and shorts the market portfolio and invests in the risk-free asset otherwise. Table I reports the annualized average return and standard deviation for each size-sorted and calendar managed portfolio used in estimation. The size and calendar sorted portfolios exhibit wide variation in average returns. If unobservable gilded-age marginal utility varied with bank deposits, knowledge about the change in bank deposits should explain the spread in size and calendar sorted average returns.
Seasonally Adjusted Deposit Growth
The seasonality of deposits and interest rates suggest caution is in order. If
cov(m t ,dep t )
is not equal to zero, changes in the marginal utility of consumption should reflect only the unexpected changes in deposits. If changes in deposits were predictable these changes would already be reflected in investor's consumption decisions and asset prices. Deposit growth was predictably seasonal during the gilded-age 18 . A simple time series regression on month dummies explains 19% of the time series variation in deposit growth. Deposits were predictably withdrawn from NYCH banks in the fall harvest season when the seasonal demand for currency in the interior was high. Failure to account for the predictable movement in bank balance sheets is equivalent to measuring our deposit growth variable with error. For example, if New York deposits witnessed a 2% decline in a month when investors expected a 5% decline this is actually an unexpectedly positive shock to bank balance sheets. In the estimation that follows dep t is defined as the seasonally-adjusted change in NYCH deposits Where seasonally adjusted change is defined as the residual from the regression of the deposit growth series on a month dummies.
18 Miron (1986) 
Results
Tables 2 report the GMM regression coefficients and t-stats for the candidate discount factor m t =  + dep t . The table also reports the overidentifying T jt statistic.
Under the null hypothesis that our estimated m is a valid discount factor the T jt statistic is distributed   k where N is the number of assets used in estimation and k is the number of estimated parameters. Table 2 reports six separate regressions corresponding to different specifications of m or different test assets used in estimation. Specifications (1) & (4) report the coefficients from a univariate GMM regression of m on deposit growth. Regardless of test assets, the regression coefficient is negative and significant at the 1% level. Changes in NYCH deposits were significantly correlated with the marginal utility implied by asset returns. Furthermore, the negative sign of the coefficient on deposit growth tells us deposits were withdrawn from NYCH banks in states of the world where implied marginal utility of wealth was high.
A word of caution is in order. Are we really measuring the CAPM equation in disguise? Regressions (1) and (4) imply that deposit growth is correlated with the marginal utility of gilded-age investors. Before we place a price on deposit risk we should be certain that we aren't simply measuring stock market risk. Deposits leave New
York banks during banking panics. The stock market also declines during banking panics as well. Both theory and the fact that the observable value-weighted stock market excess
is positive suggest the stock market is negatively correlated with marginal utility as well. When we exclude the stock market from our specification m t =  + dep t we should worry that our estimated beta may be biased due to this omitted variable. If the true specification is the CAPM equation but we estimate the regression with dep t in place of we could find a statistically significant  because changes in NYCH deposits are correlated with stock market returns.
In Table 2 specifications (2) and (5) we estimate the candidate stochastic discount factor implied by the CAPM: .  rm is negative and significant in both cases. Knowledge about the return on the aggregate market index did help explain differences in the cross-sectional of gilded-age stock returns 19 .
To properly test the null hypothesis that banking panics affected marginal utility, holding the stock market fixed, we require a multiple regression of the stochastic discount factor on our hypothetical deposit contract and the return on the stock market
The  coefficients in (7) have the same interpretation as multiple regression coefficients.
 dep tells us the affect of deposit growth on implied marginal utility holding the stock market fixed. In Table 2 specifications (3) & (6) we estimate eq. (7) via GMM. The change in NYCH deposits are significantly correlated with implied discount factors even when controlling for stock market changes. In fact, once one controls for changes in bank balance sheets knowledge about the stock market return contributes practically nothing to our understanding of national banking era asset returns!
The last point deserves clarification. Unexpected changes in bank deposits explain differences in 1866-1913 stock returns even after controlling for changes in the market portfolio. Figure 1 plots the average annual return of each portfolio against the predicted return implied by the CAPM and deposit growth factor model specifications. By itself the CAPM factor does a good job of explaining the cross-section of stock returns, however, the results in Table 2 demonstrate that the CAPM "works" because the market portfolio is correlated with bank deposits. Once one controls for changes in bank deposits knowledge about the aggregate market return adds no information about cross-sectional differences 19 The overidentifying test is rejected in the CAPM specifications (2) & (5) but not in specifications where the candidate discount factor is a function of deposit growth (1) & (4). The reader should resist the urge to draw conclusions about the relative merits of the CAPM versus deposit factors based on differences in overidentifying test statistics. The statistic is a ratio.The deposit overidentifying statistic could be smaller because the discount factor based on bank deposits better explains stock returns or because the discount factor blows up the variance of the pricing errors. Each T jt statistic is computed with a different weighting matrix rendering cross-specification comparisons unwise.
in stock returns.
This result is different (and much stronger) than most findings that "the CAPM failed". Many papers have rejected the CAPM specification by finding additional factors that help explain differences in cross sectional stock returns even after controlling for the market portfolio. In this case, the additional factor not only explains returns after controlling for the market return but completely drives out the market index as an explanatory variable!
Measuring the Cost of Insuring Against National Banking Era Panics
Recall the hypothetical derivative contract that pays dep t . Had such a contract existed a national banking era investor could have used it to insure against utility loss during banking panics. The question remains, just how costly were these panics? The regressions in Table 2 Plugging in our point estimates from estimates with all test assets and m t =  +  dep dep t ) +  Rm (R t sm -R f,t ) yields the estimated cost of insuring $100 of seasonallyadjusted deposits. The discount factor estimated with seasonally-adjusted deposit growth assigns a price $1.10 above its actuarially fair value. An investor who wished to insure against any 28-day decline in seasonal-adjusted deposits would willingly pay an expected (13 x $1.097) = $14.26 per annum to insure $100! To place these costs in perspective we can compare the cost of buying our hypothetical 28-day insurance against national banking era deposit withdrawals to the cost of buying insurance against stock market declines today. Had an investor purchased 30-day, $100 at-the-money put options on the S&P 500 every month from Jan 1990 to the present the investor would have lost an average of $13.97 per annum 20 . This is very close to the cost of insuring against seasonally-adjusted deposit withdrawals during the national banking era. The cost of unexpected deposit withdrawals between 1866-1913 was roughly similar to the cost of modern day stock market declines.
It's important to remember that this asset based estimate of the cost of deposit withdrawals is inferred from observable asset returns. This is an estimate of cost rather than a counterfactual exercise. Had actually insurance existed the observable asset returns may well have been different. Our deposit based candidate discount factor does a good job of explaining asset returns because assets exposed to banking panics have high returns to compensate investors for this exposure. The size of this compensation tells us banking panics were costly but the equilibrium level of compensation would have likely been different had credible deposit insurance been available. Our observable return based estimates should be thought of as the equilibrium price of insurance a small price taking investor would willingly pay assuming his actions had no affect on the general equilibrium prices of the other assets.
Conclusion
Bank runs are costly even in the absence of large interconnected too big to fail institutions. Irreversible investments and risk-averse savers create an environment where financial intermediaries can increase welfare by pooling savings and smoothing consumption risk. However, irreversible investments combined with asymmetric information about the quality of loan portfolios or the patience of other depositors can expose an intermediary to runs and expose the economy to systematic risk. In the era before the Federal Reserve and too big to fail, banks looked to the New York money market for a relatively safe, liquid, high return investment for their excess reserves. By combining data from the balance sheets of NYCH banks and returns of NYSE stocks one can estimate the cost of national banking era bank panics.
Unexpected changes in NYCH deposits had a significant impact on investors' stochastic discount factors. In fact, when tasked with explaining cross-sectional differences in size and calendar-sorted stock returns, knowledge about NYCH balance sheets was far more informative than knowledge about the return on the value-weighted market portfolio.
I measure the cost of national banking era bank panics by constructing hypothetical insurance contracts on NYCH deposits. These contracts would have allowed a price taking gilded-age investors to insure against changes in NYCH deposits. The price of these contracts implied by our estimated discount factors suggest banking panics were quite costly and investors would pay up to an annual 14% premium above actuarially fair value to insure against deposit losses -approximately the same premium modern day investors have willingly paid to insure against stock market declines over the past 20 years.
Average return versus predicted return g p 10 size-sorted portfolios 10size-sorted and 5 Calendar sorted portfolios dep t = percentage change in seasonally-adjusted NYCH deposits (R m -R f ) = Excess return on the value-weighted NYSE portfolio 28
